Ideological security against Communism
In another political dimension, Grenada presented an ideological challenge to the United States and its economic system. Keenly aware of this, the Bishop government used it to explain the hostility of the “big-powers”:
From the outset, the anti-imperialist nature of Grenada’s solution and the “danger” of a new, successful, non-capitalist model in the bosom of the English-speaking Caribbean was more than the Washington/London axis was willing to tolerate. The hostility of imperialism and the threat of instant confrontational politics were on the horizon the very week following March 13, 1979.[11]
Initially influenced by Black Power ideology, a typical vessel for dissent in the Caribbean, Bishop gravitated toward the formation of the JEWEL, a rural-oriented faction aimed at undermining Prime Minister Gairy’s support among the “agro-proletariat.” Eventually, the New JEWEL Movement was created by merging similar socialist political factions. It is important to note that long before any U.S. involvement, the NJM was already Marxist-Leninist oriented (in direct refutation of the belief that like Castro in Cuba, Grenada’s leadership was “forced” into leftist ideology to find allies against a hostile United States). In the Party Manifesto of 1973, it was made clear that atop the goal of redistribution of economic and political opportunity was the absolute transformation into a socialist economy with a full welfare system.[12] Early reforms were met with big success in the diversification of agriculture, strong growth rates, increases in literacy, and a slew of ambitious programs to boost development of important economic sectors. Bishop also capitalized on racial and ethnic appeal and took it to the United States, where he garnered the support of Black-American unions and Communist/Socialist groups who attended the 1981 Grenada conference, such as the Black Workers Organization and the U.S. Communist Party.[13] In the period of “Reaganomics” and dissatisfied minorities, a socialist “Black Power” movement could prove to be, however small in breadth, a considerable domestic political threat. Over an extended period of time, Bishop’s government would have likely been the target of a major U.S.-sponsored destabilization attempt had it continued its course of domestic and foreign policy. However, the MRC coup, executed by hard-line Leninists within the government, proved to be an effective substitute to remove the arguably successful “socialist experiment.”
Compensating for the Loss in Vietnam
The actual invasion of Grenada in 1983, Operation “Urgent Fury,” is best explained by the urgency and fury with which Reagan needed a successful military campaign. A show of significant force would make governments in Latin America and the Caribbean think twice about stirring the political cauldron without permission from the United States. Already in the pessimistic shroud of the post-Vietnam era, the U.S. was dealing with the after-effects of the 1979 Iran hostage crisis and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 servicemen a mere 2 days before the invasion. The MRC had largely disarmed and dismantled a majority of the militias for being “pro-Bishop,” leaving the bulk of what would be costly resistance to the American Marines out of the picture. As a quick and generally low-cost intervention (18 American dead, 116 wounded), the attack paid off. 7,000 servicemen were awarded medals for participating in the operation. Back home, the public responded with a surge in Presidential approval ratings and bipartisan support in Congress, even by Reagan’s future democratic challenger, Walter Mondale. The rapid deployment and achievement of military superiority demonstrated the still-living power of American hegemony. As William Blum smugly describes, “America had regained its manhood, by stepping on a flea.”[14]
Conclusion
Too frequently, writings on the US intervention in Grenada address the topic solely as what happened in the October of 1983- and what the Reagan Administration made up to get there- but they treat with surprising brevity and simplification the years prior. If public recognition of falsehoods related to the intervention is limited, then recognition of studies done on the relationships between Grenada and the rest of the world beforehand is even sparser in visibility. As in the in current Gulf War, surrounding the 1983 intervention was a slew of misinformation from the government, but accompanying it in its aftermath were criticisms that treated the conflict in an overly one-dimensional manner. The one qualification that can be made about both wars- ethical justifications and moral qualms aside- is that the U.S. acted on them with a specific national-strategic purpose. Between Syria, Iran, and Iraq, Iraq was chosen; between Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, Grenada was “the place to invade.”
[1] American Academic Encyclopedia, “Grenada: History and Government.”
[2] Zunes, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/2003/10grenada.htm
[3] Blum, p. 273-274
[4] New York Times, 28 March 1983.
[5] Lormand, Grenada: How We Continue to Believe the Hoaxes of Our Military Establishment.
[6] Blum, p. 274
[7] Appendix (II), Grenada is not Alone, p. 144-146
[8] Cde. Unison Whiteman, Grenada is not Alone, p. 114
[9] Cde. Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, Grenada is not Alone, p. 22
[10] O’Shaughnessy, p. 220
[11] Cde. Unison Whiteman, Grenada is not Alone, p. 119
[12] Dujmovic, p. 11
[13] Appendix (II), Grenada is not Alone, p. 144-146
[14] Blum, p. 277
Works cited:
http://www.hackingfamily.com/Jon/grenada_intervention.htm
http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/Shalominterven.html
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/2003/10grenada.htm
http://www.venusproject.com/William_Blum/parenti.htm
The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition 2003, Columbia University Press.
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/poli/soa/grenada.htm
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq95-3.htm
Blum, William. (2004). Killing Hope. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
Academic American Encyclopedia, 1991, Grolier Incorporated.