Increasing exchanges between Israel and the PLO keyed diplomatic intervention by the U.S., who sent Philip Habib to moderate negotiations. On July 24, 1981, a ceasefire within Lebanon and along the border was agreed upon, but it would prove short-lived. Sharon had already been drafting plans for another invasion into Lebanon to secure Israel’s northern border once and for all by driving the PLO out of the country. Israel complained that the ceasefire only pertained to the Lebanese border, and that the PLO could carry out attacks directed against Israel from any other location. In June 1982, the Israeli ambassador in London was attacked by Palestinian militants who were actually of a rival faction to the PLO, Abu Nidal. Israel nevertheless retaliated by launching air attacks against targets in West Beirut. A counterattack was launched from Lebanon with rockets and artillery against Northern Israel, and Israel used this as the pretext for launching Operation “Peace for Galilee.” Prime Minister Begin announced that it would be a 40-kilometer incursion, warning Syria to stay clear, but Sharon, commander of the Israeli military, would rapidly overstep this boundary, encircling Beirut and destroying the Syrian SAM emplacements. Arafat, his military on the verge of obliteration, urgently negotiated for and received a multinational force to oversee the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon. The MNF, composed of U.S., French, British, and Italian forces, facilitated the evacuation of 15,000 armed Palestinian militants to Tunisia. Under Israeli military observation, Phalange leader Bashir Gemayel was elected President on August 23, 1982, but was assassinated less than three weeks later. Meanwhile, Sharon wanted to ensure that all Palestinian militants were removed from Lebanon, and received the aid of 200 Phalange militia under the command of Elie Hobeika. On September 16, Israeli forces encircled the camps of Sabra and Chatila while Hobeika’s militia was to enter and search for arms, but the day resulted in a massacre of over one thousand (mostly unarmed) Palestinians. International outrage followed, particularly within Israel, and Israel responded by creating the Kahane Commission which found Sharon indirectly guilty of the massacre, forcing him to resign his official post of Defense Minister. However, fairly recent discoveries and testimonies, such as those by Robert M. Hatem, Hobeika’s former right-hand-man, suggest that Hobeika committed the massacres without Sharon’s knowledge while on Syria’s payroll. Nevertheless, the immediate response put intense pressure on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. Amine Gemayel was selected to succeed his brother by the Parliament, and his first goal was attaining the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces. On May 17, 1983, Israel agreed on a withdrawal with Lebanon and the U.S. conditional to Syria’s departure, but Syria rejected the proposition. Regardless, the Israeli military withdrew to the southern “security zone.”[6]
The peace process would be compounded further when the Marine barracks were attacked by a van carrying explosives on October 23, 1983, resulting in the deaths of 241 U.S. Marines. Muslim opposition groups along with Syria saw the weakened American resolve and intention of withdrawing as an opportunity to pressure Gemayel to negate the May 17 agreement with the Israelis. The Lebanese Army had evaporated because of rank-and-file defections to militias, and Gemayel was nearly powerless. On March 5, Gemayel did exactly that, and soon after the U.S. Marines were redeployed to the Mediterranean. The U.S. non-response set for future anti-West attacks and suicide bombings, and also assisted in the creation of the Shi’a Hizbullah (“party of God”) as a powerful faction in Lebanon. The following years of fighting (1984-1989) could be best described as the most chaotic and erratic of the Lebanese Civil War, where the simple “Christian factions vs. Muslim factions” label of the war would not apply. A lasting peace was only achieved after the 1989 Taif Agreements, which decreased the Maronite disproportionate edge in Parliament by expanding the National Assembly to 108 seats and giving equal shares to Christians and Muslims. In 1992, Rafiq Hariri was appointed Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Lebanon’s reconstruction was to begin under the occupation of 35,000 Syrian troops.[7]
The civil war, of course, had lasting implications for the small nation. One of the most important factors contributing to the failure of the economy during the 1980s was the disappearance of governmental authority and the shift of power toward unofficial entities. Though some of the tax revenue still managed to arrive through the first few years following the outbreak and lull of conflict, by 1983-84 the government had lost control of all ports (which had previously provided as much as half of yearly revenue in the prewar years), and could not effectively enforce collection of utility bills and taxes (at one point, utility inflows were as low as 10 percent of money owed.) Mounting public costs because of the war in addition to weakened revenue broadened budget deficits, forcing monetary expansion in order to finance them, and the country was plunged into a vicious cycle of inflation. The economy had grown more “dollarized” and capital bled from the country while the Central Bank ceased to support the Lebanese Pound, allowing it to reach all-time lows in the early 90s. In the aftermath of the war, in addition to a furiously devalued currency, the war-torn country had to face approximately $25 billion in damage to infrastructure and significant losses in skilled manpower due to emigration. [8]More so damaging to the future of Lebanon, though, was not only the unwelcome Syrian occupation, but the permanent Syrian hand that would be thrust into Lebanese politics. The post-war government was given a rubber stamp by Syrian leadership, and all major institutions were handed over to pro-Syrian elites. On October 30, 2000, Rafiq Hariri’s Cabinet released its policy statement to the Lebanese Parliament, and in it was a telling statement of Lebanon’s political status:
This requires true national unity to elevate national interests and the fate of the country above all considerations. More than ever before, this requires an alliance, cooperation, and solidarity with Syria and the deepening of mutual confidence. We are confident that the Lebanese-Syrian experience, in constant cooperation and coordination, is the most important achievement of this phase in the history of the region. It spelled out the defeat of Israel, forcing it to abide by international resolutions and withdraw, accordingly, from Lebanese territories. It also proved right our views regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, and how to manage the battle with Israel.[9]
Lebanon had become a Syrian pawn, its livelihood to serve as a front for someone else’s war. Ironically, there is speculation that Hariri’s 2005 assassination was approved by Syria; Hariri, once “Syria’s man” in the post-war period, had turned against his former masters, and as a respected force in Lebanese politics, could not continue. The horizon, however, bears a hopeful future for “the Land of the Cedars.” In March 2005, George W. Bush declared, “Freedom will prevail in Lebanon,” and thousands of Lebanese took to the streets in the name of Lebanese independence. By May 23, the UN verified that all but one Syrian military position in Lebanon had been vacated. With a vote of confidence in the new government and election results around the corner, the once-remarkable success may become reality again within this decade.[10]
[1] Lebanon- A Country Study. US Library of Congress.
[2] CIA World Factbook, Lebanon
[3] Fisk, pp. 78-81
[4] Smith, Pg. 354
[5] Rabinovich, p. 70
[6] Smith, Pg. 378-390
[7] Fisk, Pg. 630+
[8] Lebanese Ministry of Finance. The Economy.
[9] Hariri, Rafiq. Determining Lebanon’s Economic and Political Identity.
[10] Heinlein, Peter. UN Team Verifies Full Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon. 23 May 2005.