Locke on the State of Nature
On the other hand, Locke expresses a different notion of human nature and, concordantly, of the state of nature. He holds that “Men living according to reason, without a common superior on earth, to judge between them, is properly the state of nature.”[9] Because Locke’s theory is rooted in natural law, his arguments closely follow the notion of the objective rights of individuals- broadly, their freedom, equality, and independence. His portrayal of the state of nature better resembles one of anarchic individualism, an image far from the brutality and paranoia of the Hobbesian state. Locke claims, indirectly, that Hobbes fails to distinguish appropriately between the state of nature and the state of war. He also does not simply posit man in nature as a thought experiment, as does Hobbes, but he suggests that historically many have lived in such a state.
Locke asserts the transcendent reality of natural law, with reason as the tool for discovering it. In short, by initiating force, aggressors against persons or property have renounced reason (and their humanity) and are subject to force themselves.[10] Underlying Locke’s nature-war distinction, only the initiation of force constitutes a state of war, and thus a state of nature can exist in peace. While Hobbes described man in nature as primarily amoral, Locke holds the opposite as true. Besides the existentialist-like quality of morality under natural law- by which one who wills some immoral wrong has inevitably willed it universally and for himself- rationality also guides action by demonstrating the counter-productivity and destructiveness of aggression against one’s fellow man. In this way, Locke addresses the problems in Hobbes’s analysis of the violent and chaotic implications of egoism, instead arguing for the spontaneous orders caused by rational self-interested thought.
Locke’s Civil Society
The reasons Locke provides for why man might want to leave the ideal state of nature’s “perfect freedom and equality” are the “inconveniences” experienced by the majority of rational people: the costs of lack of knowledge of certain laws and an impartial adjudicator; the absence of an ultimate power for law enforcement, which allows for the strongest groups to execute what they please; and the agent’s general difficulty in judging law impartially.
For Locke, the purpose of civil society is not for the governed to be directly guided in such a way that they will survive and flourish, as Hobbes might advocate. Though survival and propagation are the preferred outcomes, the function of government is specifically to provide a framework for the protection of life, liberty, and property. Locke’s view can be summarized as one of a minimal state, whose justification requires total consent of the governed.[11] His objections to unlimited sovereignty of the kind Hobbes supports are part of an implicit undercurrent of his works, but are well-delineated in his Second Treatise in Chapter IV, “Of Slavery”:
“But freedom of men under government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.”
Unlimited sovereign authority is precisely that: the inconstant, uncertain, unknown arbitrary will of another man. The only form of government which is consistent with the rights of man is one which is restrained by the law of nature.
A Critique of Locke
By contrast, we can see the comparative improvements of Locke’s political theory over that of Hobbes, though it also possesses some significant shortcomings. Among these are issues of consent to governance, in which Locke suffers from the same plausibility-versus-consistency trade-off as Hobbes does; and the inherent conflict between the idea of electing an arbitrator and government as the imposition of a single one for all.[12]
Consent is largely a problem for any belief system which treasures the independence of man, in the sense that there are numerous externalities that complicate the pragmatic feasibility of a right to secede and form governments freely. Locke somewhat resolves this with his doctrine of tacit consent, appearing the moment that someone resides in a sovereign’s territory or owns property there. However, this is at best a patchwork fix to the problem of consent, since governance should be a compact between the state and the governed, none of which directly implies territoriality or any non-consensual obligation.
Likewise, the need for a universal arbitrator as a reason for exiting the state of nature to form civil society can be contested. One might ask, “Who is to arbitrate between the people and the state?” This creates another problem for Locke, who acknowledges it:
“Where an appeal to the Law … lies open, but the remedy is deny’d by a manifest perverting of Justice, … there it is hard to imagine any thing but a State of War. For wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer Justice, it is still violence and injury, however colour’d with the Name, Pretences, or Forms of Law…”[13]
Concerns about the capture of arbitration, especially one which is practically monopolized on issues of force, severely undermine Locke’s political theory in favor of anarchistic individualism. Likely sensing that this objection was beyond the scope of his capabilities and not inclined to accept rebellion as a solution, Locke simply suggests that those dissatisfied with arbitration, with no other appeal available, “are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.”
[1] The remainder of this paper will attempt to focus on Hobbes through the lens of this interpretation, but elements of his work better served by a more mechanistic interpretation may crop up. The primary purpose of emphasizing a more “moral” Hobbes is to make him more compatible in comparison to Locke, and to make the discussion of proper governance more meaningful.
[2] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii.
[3] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii.
[4] Hobbes, De Cive, Epistle Dedicatory.
[5] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii.
[6] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiv.
[7] Hobbes, Leviathan, xiv.
[8] The “high road” is used in the ethical egoist’s sense, i.e. the most rational action of self-interest. This could entail even a Lockean perception of morality, connecting the two thinkers quite closely.
[9] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.19
[10] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.16
[11] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.176
[12] Locke’s Political Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/. Accessed March 05, 2007.
[13] Locke, Two Treatises. 2.20