Rule utilitarianism as a solution
Rule utilitarianism is an attempt at fixing this insurmountable pragmatic challenge, but it only serves to reaffirm, as almost a utilitarian’s admission of guilt, the puzzles encountered in using the greatest happiness principle as a moral guide. Whereas deontological moral theories fix their rules as absolute, rule utilitarianism only provides its laws as “rules of thumb” which supposedly tend to bring about the greatest happiness. For the former, in practice, there is a much higher correspondence between reality and its ideal principles than the latter possesses. Though these tremendous obstacles for the greatest happiness principle do not necessarily refute it, they are evidence for the weakness of utilitarianism as a theory which represents reality.
Supposing that we can accurately calculate the greatest good, what kind of outcomes could we find? Take a society of k agents, whose utility distribution is expressed by (U1, U2, … Uk) and whose total utility is, accordingly, Ut = U1 + U2 + … Uk. Compare different distributions: A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10), B = (15, 15, 10, 5, 5), and C = (20, 15, 5, 5, 6). Holding that any synergistic gains in benefits (elimination of class barriers, social stability, etc.) are accounted for, the principle of utility should show moral indifference between A and B (both of sum 50), and ideally choose C (sum 51). Yet C, hypothetically, could possibly be a society of slaves. This does not constitute a logical objection to utilitarianism, and to contend so would be to commit the fallacy of using an external value as a standard of judgment, as I mentioned earlier. However, it is certainly an implication that a utilitarian must acknowledge when advocating this as a moral theory.
In light of this, utilitarian calculus can always be revised appropriately to face any objection or unpleasant reality. Different weights can be placed on certain kinds of suffering or kinds of action to the point that the consequentialist moral structure can be functionally isomorphic with a deontological structure. Though each revision does not make consequentialism void ipso facto, it progressively weakens the significance of using a results-oriented moral theory as an alternative to deontological theories. While Jeremy Bentham accuses moral thinking of being tethered to the notion of usefulness, it is here where the argument can be turned against the utilitarian for attaching itself to some notion of duty.
Rule utilitarianism is one such attempt to correct difficulties by combining consequentialism with a desire to adhere to traditional moral rules (promise-keeping, non-violence, private property, etc.) All the utilitarian must do is hold that the pragmatic result of some rule (formerly conceived as a duty in itself) leads to the greatest happiness, or that violation of it leads to the greatest pain. For example, Mill would argue against a hypothetical slave society as posited earlier by saying that no such society could ever exist. At best, this is a very weak method of refutation and the burden of proof is on Mill to either show that the empirical facts strongly affirm the statement, or to allow that such a society is morally acceptable. The alterability of the standard moral content of utilitarianism subjects it to the dangers of whim and abuse, which frequently undermine its significance as a theory of how we ought to behave. One need only examine each time historically a “greater good” was invoked in order to mobilize people to commit atrocities (the Holocaust, the Soviet purges, Rwandan genocide, etc.)
Mill’s faulty proof for the principle of utility
The entire discussion prior to this sentence, of course, is mostly an exercise of thought and is not essential; simply put, Mill’s Utilitarianism fails to present a valid justification for the principle of utility in the first place. In fact, it is this failure that indirectly causes the aforementioned difficulties. There is no relationship drawn between the moral theory he advocates and any believable story of human nature. The previously expressed concerns are mostly problems encountered with utilitarian principles as a given, but how these principles were derived in the first place must be addressed. Mill’s bogus proof is the first part of this failure:
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it… this, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good, that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
The equivocation of the word “desirable” in his proof is clear. He intends to argue that people desire happiness, which makes it desirable (i.e. intrinsically good). However, he fails to account for the different senses of the word “desirable.” His proof could correctly assert that if people desire happiness, it is capable of being desired, but his intended demonstration that happiness is intrinsically worthy of being desired because people desire it is fallacy. By Mill’s logic, one could simply substitute any noun- like “cats”- for “happiness,” and there would be a proof for the intrinsic value of cats! The problem with Mill’s proof is that what people contingently happen to desire does not change what is “desirable” (in the intrinsic sense); just because nobody in the 14th century desired equal recognition of the rights of women does not mean that it is not in fact desirable.[8]
Mill’s Fallacy of Composition
Furthermore, the second part of his proof commits the fallacy of composition. While it is indeed true that the good of one individual contributes to the good of the aggregate of all persons (which is merely a sum total of individual goods), the reverse (that the general happiness is a good to the individual), which is the goal of Mill’s proof, is not true. The aggregate of all persons is not an entity in itself which possesses a good, and any increase in the aggregate of happiness is not necessarily fulfilling the desire for happiness of all its members; it could be fulfilling the desires of one, few, or many. Even supposing the reality of some kind of collective entity, Mill provides no reason why we ought to care for each other’s happiness.
Is Utilitarianism a viable ethical or political philosophy?
Is there, yet, any defense of utilitarianism which renders it plausible? In the absence of a proof of the principle of utility, Bentham contends that all moral systems reduce to a form of utility, are ambiguous, or cannot be followed consistently. While Bentham’s claims about the utilitarian climate of moral reasoning are true, its implications do not end in utilitarianism. How agents ought to behave must be connected in some way to a view of the physical nature of those agents and the physical reality in which they reside. It would, for example, be nonsensical to argue that an incorporeal being has a right to his own personal space, or a right not to be stabbed—these are all rights that implicitly depend on the agent residing in physical space. Likewise, a reasonable morality which pertains to human beings corresponds to their nature—desiring to live, existing in space and time, mortal, requiring sustenance, etc. There is no justification for a moral theory that does not consider these facts (it is either ambiguous or inconsistent). In this respect, moral theory is concerned with utility. Since rights are derived from man acting in the function of man, so it is no surprise that these rights are concerned with fulfilling man’s functions and purpose (the ultimate end), and are thus utility-related. The fundamental difference between utility in this sense and utility in the utilitarian sense is that the former more generally deals with the pragmatic satisfaction of any given purpose, while the latter is its own moral system which prescribes a specific purpose: the greatest happiness for all. In summary, Bentham’s contention can be satisfied without requiring the adoption of the specific normative guidelines of utilitarianism.
The period extending from the late 19th century to the present day could be described as “the slow death of deontological morality to consequentialism.” Indeed, changes in the texture of popular philosophical discourse have invariably seeped into the political environment. The Progressive movement of the early 20th century changed the focus in America from political to “economic” freedoms- no longer the right to property, but the right to a decent standard of living. Social revolutions occurred everywhere in the world, to “make the lot better” of struggling groups: the proletariat in Russia, the Aryans in Germany, and the dissatisfied of Cuba. Each year, the most powerful governments of the world shift policy toward socialism and guarantees of results for the citizen, whether it is healthcare, shelter, employment, or social acceptance. Underlying this great movement is a moral righteousness endorsed by consequentialist philosophies which share the general forms of Mill’s Utilitarianism (not his political theory, however), usually with specific collectivist undertones. In any case, these belief systems have been shown, in argument, to be implausible, and even evil; whether they will work out is a question that has been and will be answered in history.
[1] Bruce Hauptli, Lecture Supplement on Mill.
[2] “Consequentialism” is used to represent the idea that the right act is one that produces the best overall state of affairs.
[3] Philippa Foot, in Pojman, 215.
[4] I will use “deontological” chiefly as a contrast to “consequentialist” for the remainder of the paper; “deontological” is meant to include all non-consequentialist theories.
[5] The objection could present a problem for a moral theory which mixes moral obligation between means and ends, but such a theory is already problematic in itself and does not merit discussion.
[6] This is in accordance with “negative responsibility” entailed by consequentialism.
[7] Bernard Williams, in Pojman, 227.
[8] Hauptli, Lecture Supplement on Mill.