Animal Rights and a Critique of Singer’s Speciesism

Animals and Research

Millions of animals are used each year in the United States in scientific experiments, but to what end? A few critics have objected to animal research on utilitarian grounds, suggesting that the pain caused by these experiments is far too great, but the veracity of this claim can be hotly contested. Most modern medical achievements have come because of successful animal experimentation, and the amount of suffering should there have existed a ban on such experimentation would likely have been vastly greater because of uncured diseases, unknown effects of common chemicals, and weaker understandings of biological patterns. In a utilitarian measurement, one must also include potential future advancements to be lost should there be a ban on animal testing; the sufferings of animals seem small compared to the improvements they have yielded. In any case, our obligation to them is a necessary consideration when doing these experiments, and we must do everything in our power to both mitigate suffering as a result of these experiments and assess whether they are for whimsical entertainment, like the cat-eye gouging, or for a higher purpose. With the inevitable suffering in mind, it is also critical to accept alternatives to animal experimentation, such as computer simulation, to achieve the same goals. (Cohen)

In Singer’s reflection on animal experiments, he attempts to delegitimize experiments on the grounds that their subjects are unfairly chosen: “Since a speciesist bias, like a racist bias, is unjustifiable, an experiment cannot be justifiable unless the experiment is so important that the use of a brain-damaged human would also be justifiable.” Holding that this brain-damaged human is at the level of the animal in moral capacity, Singer is correct in this assertion. However, it is important to stress that the speciesist bias would only come from the choice of an animal over the brain-damaged human merely because the human is technically homo-sapient, but when given the choice between a mouse and a rational adult, accusations of speciesism are moot when the mouse is selected. Still, Singer also appears to be making a last-ditch effort to appeal to the speciesists himself when he qualifies, “…unless the experiment is so important…” The significance of the experiment is not relevant to the choice between the brain-damaged infant orphan and the lab rat because the orphan and the rat have moral parity! Most attachments to such beings, like the brain-dead child’s importance over a rodent, are arbitrary values most likely generated by our ease of identifying with human features over animal features, and definitely not generated by anything but a truly speciesist claim that dictates that a lump of cells organized in a certain manner is more intrinsically valuable than another lump of cells (both without moral autonomy, existent or potential, of course).

Philosophy is better than emotion

It is often very simple to argue about a topic like animal rights with emotion; “Animals have feelings too!” “How would YOU feel if…” or “they pour acid in their eyes!” are all things you might hear from someone critical of the long-standing history of human usage of animals. Unfortunately, emotions are not a part of the moral equation, and complicating the issue with how we feel is definitely not the route to finding the proper ethical solution, nor is blissfully accepting routines that are inherently wrong in the process of our usage of animals merely because of tradition. Nevertheless, there is a popular stigma attached to the use of animals now that insinuates that it is a moral crime committed by humanity that must be righted. Too frequently it is heard that eating meat is a “guilty pleasure,” not because of the health risks, but because of the animals that must die to make it edible. It is almost as if “animal liberationists” have a moral monopoly on dealing with animals, and that naysayers to their cause are only bound by habit and those bothersome practical constraints. It shouldn’t be unfair to say, however, that People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals could possibly be a collective organization of butchers.

Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, London, Jonathan Cape, 1976.

Peter Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 9, 1980, pp. 325-37.

Cohen, Carl. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,”

The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 315. October 2, 1986.

Frey, R.G. Rights, Killing, and Suffering. Blackwell Publishers, 1983.

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