[Written for a Problems of Democracy” course to answer the prompt: “Is democracy an end in itself or is it a means to an end (or ends)? If it is an end in itself, what makes it so? If it serves other ends, what are they? If it serves other ends, is it essential (indispensable or necessary) to the achievement of those ends, or is it possible that better substitutes (i.e., a better political system) might be found? Answer this question with reference to any three texts assigned in the course.”]
“Democracy” is a very messy word. It is frequently invoked in a political context as the object or ideological source of an action, generally for the reason that in the self-described “modern” world, democracy is the unquestioned political ideal. If what is meant by it is “popular sovereignty,” meaning that individuals must consent to being ruled in a particular fashion, then there is no problem with that proposition. Unfortunately, political concepts must be expressed in language, so it is no surprise that “democracy” suffers from constant use with different definitions, the result often being misunderstanding and abusive equivocation. A proclaimed enemy of democracy is not always evil, as much as an advocate of democracy is not always good. To resolve this problem, the next logical step is to figure out what democracy means, both substantively and morally.
Should we be asking, “how can we best achieve democracy?” or “how can we best use democracy?” A thorough clarification of the word is required prior to any further discussion. Simply defining democracy as “rule by the people” is woefully deficient: it says nothing about what, exactly, the people are ruling. There are two principal questions to ask of government, and thus two senses in which “democracy” can be used: what kinds of decisions must a government make, and how are those decisions to be made? Some definitions of democracy primarily refer to the former, holding that democracy is rule by the people over all things; some only describe the latter, imagining democracy as a process by which some conception of the good is achieved; and others describe a mix of both. To simplify discussion greatly, “democracy” will be treated as a factual set of procedural conditions, namely equal voting rights and majoritarian or pluralistic rule of any kind; reference to democracy as an intrinsic good will be labeled “normative democracy.”
With that in mind, the place of democracy in the world can be considered. In itself, democracy can not be good because there is no valid justification for such a claim. Similarly, government in general is merely a means to an end: the assurance of individual rights.[1] Democracy is one possible instrument by which the good government can be achieved, that has demonstrated itself to be effective in part; in no way, however, it is a necessary or sufficient condition for that achievement.
First, we must examine what holding democracy as an end in itself entails. If democracy is defined as a process or structure that meets certain conditions, then the essential claim is that no matter what the outcome of that process is, it is good so long as the process was conducted fairly (i.e. in accordance with democracy, which is intrinsically good). The first possible case of doing so, which is holding that there is a universal and timeless good in the procedural form of democracy, is the philosophical equivalent of believing that the consumption of cheese is a universal and timeless good. How a good of this kind can possibly be justified or metaethically described fundamentally boils down to some form of mysticism, an extremely uninteresting field of study (if studying is even the appropriate activity).[2]
The second case of intrinsically valuable democracy is one that supervenes on assumptions about the nature of humans and reality that lead to their respective moral conclusions. Primarily, the belief in the existence of a collective entity justifies believing that such an entity can possess properties like “preference” and “goodness.” Individuals are then beholden to this collective entity. Under this view, the repeated applications of democratic processes are the means by which individuals communicate their preferences, which are then aggregated into the collective preference, whose satisfaction constitutes the good. Under this conception, political activity is not just a means to an end, but an end in itself, because it realizes the intrinsic principles essential to society.
Some thinkers have taken the normative democratic approach. A “direct democracy” interpretation of Rousseau can be construed as holding democracy as an end in itself. He states, “… whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free…”[3] In other words, to be free is to abide by the general will. Part of following the general will comes in society finding it, through the ideal means of doing so: the full participation of the sovereign.[4] Rousseau’s belief in the importance of this democratic process being untainted by a voter’s “particular will” (self-interest) is reinforced by his belief that economic, social, and political classes must be eliminated in order to prevent conflicts of interest that inhibit the proper discovery of the general will. The society must also take measures such as censorship and the establishment of a civil religion in order to “socialize” its people, leading them to identify closely with their society, and thus the general will.
More generally speaking, how democracy attains its authoritativeness may explain its moral attractiveness. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville explains how circumstances in America had led to the majority becoming “not only preponderant, but irresistible”:
The moral authority of the majority is partly based upon the notion, that there is more intelligence and wisdom in a number of men united than in a single individual, and that the number of legislators is more important than their quality. The theory of equality is thus applied to the intellects of men… Like all other powers… the authority of the many requires the sanction of time in order to appear legitimate.[5]
This argument for majoritarian rule is inherently informational, referring to the positive productive relationship between majorities and correct conclusions about the good. It assumes intellectual equivalence, a concept then extended by quantitative aggregation into conclusive superiority in numbers. Going further, Tocqueville cites another intuitive facet of democracy: “the moral power of the majority is founded upon yet another principle, which is, that the interests of the many are to be preferred to those of the few.”[6] In the same regard as the second, it assumes a substantive equality of interests which can be aggregated.
One possible function of democracy could be to find some proper course of collective action which takes into account equally the preferences of every voter, aggregating them into one “social preference.” The case for democracy seems to be made simply enough. However, this approach encounters problems predicating on the intuitive characteristics of democracy as described by Tocqueville. One on hand, the assumption of equality in intelligence is clearly flawed, and experience clearly shows that majorities are not always correct in matters of fact, even through time (e.g., the insistent disbelief of many Americans in evolution). On the other hand, the belief that the interests of the majority are more valuable is a concept with very narrow truth that has been extrapolated to encompass all things; the flaw, once again, lies in a broad assumption of “equality of interests.”
Except for the cases where the good of democracy is self-defining, there is nothing about democracy that guarantees the fulfillment of any conception of the good, much less that of individual rights. In the observant words of E.B. White, “democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half the time.” Indeed, there is no logical necessity linking “fair” democratic processes with “good” outcomes. One need only imagine a dictator ordering that all members of a certain ethnic group be killed, and then imagine a democratic assembly doing the same. On average, majoritarian rule may perform better, because power is decentralized across many individuals with diverse interests, but there is little to stop factions from forming to the detriment of the minority.
In contrast to de Tocqueville’s account, Cass Sunstein would argue against time-endorsed majorities as bearing moral authority. His book, Why Societies Need Dissent, discusses the pitfalls caused by conformity in all settings, as well as why it happens: “for each of us, conformity is often a sensible course of action… one reason we conform is that we often lack much information of our own, and the decisions of others provide the best information we can get.”[7] The initial presence of a vigorous and significant group of persons advocating a certain position may begin a self-perpetuating cycle of conformity. Thus, the long-standing opinions of the group are likely not to be based on any intellectual merit, but simply by social pressures.
Furthermore, the idea of “one man, one vote” (i.e. equality of interests) can not be reasonably separated from the arena of issues upon which that vote has an effect. It is the abstraction of certain qualities from an individual that gives him the right of participation in the democratic process. However, these qualities relate specifically to what rights the individual forfeits upon choosing to enter civil society. A man, for example, will forfeit his right to use unlimited violence at his own discretion, and subject it to the democratic process. The belief in total majoritarian rule would imply that minorities would have consented to control by the democratic process over all things, such as property. No individual, such as a very talented and innovative person, would consent to rule by society over the totality of his holdings (this being a complete losing proposition for him). Moreover, no force or right of nature could require him to comply with the majoritarian wishes of humanity. Therefore, the idea that the interests of each other individual with regard to his property are equal, summed together, and held against him righteously is pure fiction.[8]
Democracy does not inevitably achieve the ends of individual rights. It may happen to be that in an anarchic state of nature, a group of persons in proximity choose to never initiate violence. Likewise, it is possible that a dictator may opt to respect individual rights.
Finding the correct political system does not depend on some predetermined plan or construction, but in experience. The key to fulfilling the protection of individual liberty lies not necessarily in “democracy” of a particular sort, but in some of its abstract components. For one, individuals must have some kind of input of their beliefs and preferences into how they will be governed in order for that governance to be effective. The manifestation of this input, however, can vary widely depending on the circumstances. Beyond the discovery of the foundational principles of governance is their implementation. The reality we live in is one of scarce resources, and our nature is one of fallibility. Choices about how to enforce laws is subject to judgments of what possible actions best realize those principles. In a small, walled city-state, a convention of all citizens at some central location can be an effective way of translating each person’s individual preferences into a city-wide policy. In a massive country like the United States, this is impossible, yet at the same time decisions involving the entire country must still be made- even if this entails a lack of direct democratic participation.
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill reflects this sentiment. Though Mill is a utilitarian- and thus considers the individual rights compromisable in the rare situation where doing so leads to the greatest happiness- he holds a similar line of thought: social institutions exist to fulfill the good (in his case, the greatest happiness principle), and thus they need to be adapted to the context in which they operate.[9] Democracy as some predetermined or fixed form of institution is unlikely to maximally attain individual rights; it is variations on it and intermixing its processes with institutional structures to check abuses of its power that achieve good government.
One hypothetical situation gives insight into the true role of democracy. Suppose there were a “machine of goodness” built by a reputable and objective scientist, into which some conception of the good and information about contemporary circumstances (such as the amount of available resources, what kinds of problems are common, etc.) were programmed. The output of the machine would be the ideal arrangement of those resources to fulfill that good. Would anyone choose democracy as a choice process over that machine? When there is a negative conception of the good as is the case with individual rights, the function of democracy is to assure that rights are best respected by allowing the input of many individuals in the context of resource scarcity and limited information. Its theoretical purpose, however, is not to be an excuse for individuals to manifest their subjective preferences in government. Democracy as an end in itself is, at its best, a stolen concept.
[1] I do not intend to set out and prove individual rights, but at least use them as imperatives by which government must operate.
[2] A detailed explanation of why intrinsic values as the ones mentioned are nonsense can be found in “The Subjectivity of Values” in J.L. Mackie’s book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
[3] Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On the Social Contract: Book I. http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon_01.htm (Accessed April 23, 2007)
[4] Of course, Rousseau could be interpreted otherwise, as perhaps holding the general will as the conception of the good which does not necessarily have to be found via democracy.
[5] Tocqueville, p. 112
[6] Ib. at 112-113
[7] Sunstein, p. 5
[8] This is a quick and dirty assessment of why majority rule over everything makes no sense when combined with individual sovereignty.
[9] Mill, p. 262