Three Case Studies in Congressional and Gubernatorial Elections

In American politics, we have a bad habit of focusing our democratic attention on Presidential elections before anything else. One is more likely to hear someone say “Well, that’s democracy in action for you” about a bid for the US Presidency than a race for the District 3 seat in New York. Ironically, these smaller races, which happen by the hundreds every two years, are the real mechanisms through which our democracy attempts to function properly, and these elections can be as complex and dynamic as any executive competition.

For any member of Congress seeking re-election, negotiating deals with other Congressmen and lobbyists on Capitol Hill (the “hill style”) is just as important as courting the constituency (the “home style”) is in getting votes. A candidate’s value to his constituency lies within his ability to “bring home the bacon”- pass beneficial federal legislation for his supporters or future supporters- while serving as an effective legislator on the hill to formulate national policy. These are often in conflict, and a savvy Congressman will know how to balance the two in order to insure his re-election through his words, his votes, and his bills. (Fenno, Mayhew)

Money, “the mother’s milk of politics,” is necessary for critical campaign functions (paying for travel, releasing literature, buying expensive media air-time, etc.) This is not without statistical and logical proof: candidates who spent the most money on their campaigns won 95% of House and 94% of Senate contests (Opensecrets.org). Though candidates may fund themselves with their own personal property or individual contributions, campaign money is frequently “earned” on Capitol Hill. A Congressman’s promises, votes, committee appointments, and actions on the Hill all play a role in the attention (money) he receives from PACs (Political Action Committees). Generally, a Congressman sitting in the House Committee on Agriculture would likely receive a campaign contribution from an Agricultural PAC, such as the Texas Farm Bureau, with the implicit understanding that he will favorably review the contributor PAC’s desired legislation. How money enters a candidate’s coffers, then, is a very potent way of discerning what and to whom a politician’s real promises are. The existence of committees follows a “distributional theory” of their purpose: they are created, beside their technical informational function, to give lawmakers policy influence that assists in their re-election, whether it is in attaining these campaign contributions, or passing bills for constituencies back at home (Herrera Lecture Notes).

The incumbency in any Congressional race is a formidable foe; with actions to back their words along with committee assignments to draw PAC money, availability of staff, name recognition and reputation from previous campaigns, and other special privileges, incumbents wield a very large edge over potential challengers. Challengers must be able to stand up monetarily against the incumbent “war chest” (funds gathered over the years of the term), including leaping over financial hurdles such as primary elections. A “quality” challenger will be able to generate enough funds to match the incumbents’ in effectiveness (using his own personal wealth, which is often necessary), while attaining or using previous name recognition and political experience to attract voters. (Lecture Notes)

Because the electorate typically does not have the interest or means to investigate the merits of candidates in Congressional races, the media is usually the only outlet for information to reach the majority of voters. While preference for “biased” networks as a demographic might harm a candidate, typically the media (that is not directly on a candidate’s payroll) only significantly damages a campaign when it widely publicizes scandal. As a conduit for messages from candidates, however, the media is critical. Attack ads vilify opponents while spreading name recognition, and effective ad campaigns, both by “targeting” and skillful design can make or break a victory.

Finally, the demographics of a district (or state, in the case of Senate races) can work in favor of candidates. Descriptive demographics, such as ethnicity and race, allow minority candidates easier identification with voters, or even guaranteed victory in majority-minority districts (Fenno, pg. 11). More frequently, demographical advantages encompass substantive aspects of the population. For example, in a district composed mostly of blue-collar workers, a labor-oriented, pro-union platform will likely win the election.

This paper examines the reelection of three incumbent US Congressmen: House representative Timothy H. Bishop (D-NY), Senator George Voinovich (R-OH), and House representative Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL, District 25).

Timothy H. Bishop House Races

In the 2002 Midterm elections, Timothy H. Bishop, the Provost of Southampton College, captured New York’s US House District 1 seat in a tight race against Republican incumbent Felix J. Grucci. Though out-raised by over $400,000 by his opponent, Bishop managed to attack Grucci’s record, particularly on environmental issues, and win by a 50-49% margin (Opensecrets.org).On a narrow, vulnerable alley of victory, Bishop would have to begin rallying a weak constituency while working on Capitol Hill as a freshman Congressman with no prior political experience.

Ideologically speaking, Bishop generally voted party-line Democrat on “the big issues”; According to the PAC rating system, he was rated 100% by NARAL, indicating a pro-choice voting record; 30% by the US COC, indicating an anti-business voting record; 100% by the LCV, indicating pro-environment votes; 16% by the Christian Coalition: an anti-family voting record; 100% by APHA, indicating a pro-public health record; 100% by SANE, indicating a pro-peace voting record; 0% by FAIR, indicating a voting record loosening immigration; 100% by the AFL-CIO, indicating a pro-labor voting record; 100% by the ARA, indicating a pro-senior voting record; and 19% by NTU, indicating a “Big Spender” on tax votes (Bishop OnTheIssues). Not surprisingly, his PAC contributions for the 2003-2004 election cycle were in line with his actions on Capitol Hill. During his term, he was assigned to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Education and the Workforce. The top three contributors to his campaign were transportation unions, retirement interest groups, and public sector unions, respectively. Bishop was also a top House recipient of contributions from architectural services, miscellaneous unions, pro-choice PACs, teachers’ unions, and transport unions (5^th, 4^th, 2^nd, 4^th, and 3^rd) (Opensecrets.org, Bishop: Campaign Finance/Money). In analysis of the contribution data, votes, and committee assignments, it is fair to say that Bishop acted in a politically consistent manner for his first term.

Challenging what appeared to be Bishop’s shaky incumbency, William Manger, a former Southampton Village trustee and senior policy advisor in the U.S. Department of Transportation, attempted to make a stand in the evenly-divided district (NYGOP). In a humorous article published in The North Shore Sun, Gregory Zeller points out a few problems in Manger’s campaign:

Never mind that the person on the street can’t grasp Mr. Manger’s political positions, or even pick him out of a lineup. Besides the little snippet at the end of his TV commercials (“I’m Bill Manger and I approved this message”), we can barely recognize his voice — and we’re the media! In an election season! And he’s running for the U.S. Congress in our district! Shouldn’t he be kissing our butt, or at least taking our calls?

The article, appropriately titled “Who is Bill Manger?,” exposes the fundamental failure to achieve the first and most important factor in any race: name recognition. Certainly, by not reaching out to the grassroots media such as The North Shore Sun, he was not pushing any harder toward that goal. Where Manger managed to stand tallest was in fundraising, but he could not stand tall enough; while Congressman Bishop managed to raise and spend over $1.9 million, Manger’s campaign could only generate $1.4 million (with a generous 17% of that contributed by the candidate himself). Even Bishop, with an “anti-business” PAC rating, outstripped the pro-business Republican ticket in business PAC contributions by over 100%, while almost absolutely dominating labor (a whopping $378,206 to $5,575!) (Opensecrets.org). From examining the 2002 Bishop-Grucci race, any quality challenger might have been able to defeat the very vulnerable and inexperienced freshman, or perhaps narrowed the margin of loss. Manger simply ran an ineffective, impotent campaign, and it is not unlikely that a majority of his votes came more from party loyalty than “swing” voters.

While objective press coverage on the race was fairly limited, a large number of local Long Island newspapers ran editorials, many of them denouncing the Manger campaign for launching fallacious attacks on Bishop’s credibility. As Grucci did in 2002, Manger ran a fierce attack ad campaign that ended in tragic discredit and loss of key votes. Bishop was accused of running Southampton College into a $55 million deficit and bankruptcy (which never happened), and furthermore baselessly charged with failing “to support the troops” in Iraq and Afghanistan (Kelly, “Bishop & Manger…”). The Suffolk Times passed an editorial endorsement of Bishop 4 days before the election:

When a candidate has no record to run on and little more than platitudes to reflect what he or she stands for, voters can expect a negative campaign. And that’s exactly what they’ve gotten from Bill Manger, whose nasty attack ads have sunk almost to the level of Felix Grucci’s 2002 campaign. Voters in the 1st C.D. rightfully rejected it then, and they should again.

Indeed, Manger was making the same mistake that had been made in 2002. “Mr. Manger’s ads personify everything that is wrong with the electoral process. They are distorted, they are mean-spirited and they are another example of the win-at-any-cost mentality that has come to make the American voter despise politicians,” states an editorial on bishopforcongress.com. What had made Grucci lose by a 1% margin was only deepening the new GOP challenger’s failure to capitalize on a contested seat.

Demographically, District 1 had no important characteristics beside party affiliations, which was an approximate 50/50 split between registered Republicans and Democrats. The race appeared to be entirely determined by candidate strength and appeal to swing voters, and most issues at stake were untouched by the presidential coattails which only served to solidify partisan votes.

Though not nearly as vulnerable as he was after his slim victory in 2002, Bishop will have to continue striving to satisfy his constituency to re-elect him in 2006. It was by luck and the incompetence of his opponents in the two previous elections that he was victorious. Even with two terms of experience, Bishop may still be defeated if a quality challenger with a substantive agenda and the right criticisms capitalizes on the still-small 6% margin. For the time being, however, he appears to be doing a good job creating loyal voters by “bringing home the bacon”: “Over the course of his first two-year term in the House of Representatives, Tim Bishop has established that he’s responsive to the needs of his constituents and knows how to deliver for them.” (Suffolk Times endorsement).

George Voinovich Gubernatorial Races

Senator George Voinovich, an Ohio Republican, has a rich history of political experience, having served a series of local government posts from 1963 until his election to the governorship of Ohio in 1990. After serving two terms as governor, he ran for the state’s vacated Senate seat against Mary O. Boyle, whom he surpassed by over $5 million in fund-raising ($7,780,850 to $2,230,820) and defeated with a 56.5% to 43.5% vote (ProjectVoteSmart). By the 2004 election, Voinovich would be an extremely formidable incumbent holding a seat in a battleground state.

In comparison to his opponent, Eric D. Fingerhut, Voinovich absolutely dominated campaign finance; while the Senator conjured $10,071,214, his Democrat opponent could only come up with a meager $1,171,559. Undoubtedly, Voinovich’s tenure in the Senate (and visibly strong incumbency) gave him a broad coalition of financial allies. Aside from the typical GOP big-business ensemble, such as the manufacturing sectors (over $633,000 combined), health professionals ($354,041), and assorted financial/insurance/real-estate interests ($1,329,135), he gathered money from interest groups that would typically support his opponents. Despite a 0% rating by the ARA (indicating an “anti-senior” voting record), his number one group of contributors was ironically retirees, providing over $500,000 to his campaign, and he gathered almost twice as much as Fingerhut did from Labor PACs. In his Senate term from 1998-2004, Voinovich sat on committees for Environment and Public Works and Small Business, which drew contributions from energy and mining companies ($638,000) and miscellaneous businesses (over $1m) (Opensecrets.org).

Fingerhut, the Democratic nominee, had previous political experience as a State Senator in Ohio from 1991-1992, from which he resigned to serve a term in the US House (1993-1994), and then served another State Senate term from 1998-2004. Though not an unseasoned legislator, Fingerhut’s repertoire would not stand well against the political behemoth in Voinovich. By mid-2003, Fingerhut’s statewide name recognition was a paltry 45%, standing against Voinovich’s 99% and potential celebrity contender Jerry Springer’s 98% (OCC Government Affairs). Whether or not Fingerhut was simply a quality challenger pitted against an even higher-quality opponent, he did not clock a quality challenger’s performance. In the presidential battleground of Ohio, in which George Bush defeated Democrat John Kerry in a narrow 51-49% victory, George Voinovich defeated Democrat Eric Fingerhut in a 64-36% landslide. Not even the presidential coattails could save Fingerhut’s doomed campaign.

For future elections, it appears that Voinovich will plainly be invincible, barring full-blown scandal or outright treason. He has experience on the Hill, has raised millions of dollars before, and is reputable as a policymaker, while his constituents know him and idolize him as the man who saved Cleveland from bankruptcy in 1979. As one organization puts it: “Everything Senator Voinovich does have as its goal improving the lives of the people of Ohio. The simple question, “How does it help Ohio?” has always been central to his work.” (JAG)

Mario Diaz-Balart House Races

After serving in the Florida House of Representatives, Mario Diaz-Balart ran for Florida’s District 25 US House seat in 2002 as a Republican candidate, defeating Annie Betancourt 65%-35%. Largely backed by the standard Republican arsenal- business, finance, health- Diaz-Balart collected over $1m in campaign funds against Betancourt’s $170,000. These contributions would set the tone for Diaz-Balart’s 2002-2004 term, and subsequent uncontested victory in the 2004 election cycle.

Despite having no challenger, Diaz raised funds to campaign in the interest of his own career, and made a respectable showing of $544,127, more than some candidates raise in actual races. During his 2002-2004 term, he served on the Budget, Transportation and Infrastructure committees, securing some contributions from the antsy financial sector (about $25,000) and assorted transportation and construction interests ($84,000). The remainder consisted of the standard Republican guns (no pun intended). (Opensecrets.org)

It is easy to speculate why nobody rose to challenge Diaz-Balart in 2004. An incumbents’ strength for his next election is usually identifiable primarily from his margin of victory in the previous, both by count of vote and monetary support. In this case, the race ended with a huge margin of victory on both accounts (30% margin of victory and $1 million raised for a beginner’s US House race). Diaz represents a large portion of District 25, the Republican Cuban-American community, both substantively and descriptively. Especially after his “free ride” in 2004, 2006 will prove to be difficult to lose for this up-and-coming politician.